Implementing the Global Health Security Agenda : progress and impact from U.S. government investments by Center for Global Health (U.S.). Division of Global Health Protection.
Implementing the Global Health Security Agenda: 




Patrick Adams/RTI; U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Global Health Protection (CDC DGHP), Cote D’Ivoire; FAO Guinea
Page 5 photo: Anselme Sanou, CDC DGHP/Burkina Faso country office
Page 7 photo: PREDICT, UC Davis
Page 14 photo: Athit Perawongmtha
Page 17 photo: PREDICT, UC Davis
Progress and Impact from U.S. Government Investments  |   1
Background
Across the globe, there are many examples of new and 
reemerging pathogens spreading quickly, resulting 
in epidemics and outbreaks that can potentially 
overwhelm health systems and devastate economies. 
One hundred years ago, one of the deadliest pandemics 
in modern history began sickening people all over 
the world, including Americans. The virus, related to a 
strain of H1N1 influenza still active today, eventually 
infected a third of all people on Earth, killing up to 50 
million, three times the number of lives lost during 
World War I. Almost a century later, the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic in West Africa exposed major weaknesses 
in country and global capabilities to address biologic 
threats, claimed more than 11,000 lives, and cost 
billions in economic losses. In 2017, there were 
outbreaks of pathogens that had the potential to and 
did spread across regions and even the entire globe. 
While these emerging and re-emerging threats vary in 
size and scope, each highlights the need for continued 
prevention, detection, and response to help protect 
the health of Americans and global populations. 
An infectious disease threat anywhere can be 
a threat everywhere. In today’s interconnected 
world, a pathogen can travel around the 
globe to major cities in as little as 36 hours.1  
Under the Global Health Security Agenda, 
the United States has invested $1 billion to 
assist in building country capacities across 11 
key technical areas,  which has contributed 
to the earlier detection of infectious disease 
threats, prevention of avoidable outbreaks 
and further spread, and the rapid and 
effective response to new outbreaks.
Many pathogens of global health security concern 
are zoonotic diseases – pathogens that can be 
transmitted between animals and humans. Over 
the last 60 years, this type of pathogen accounted 
for more than 70 percent of emerging infectious 
diseases. Population growth has brought people 
closer to one another and closer to animal reservoirs 
of zoonotic pathogens, increasing the opportunity for 
pathogens to cross between animals and humans. 
Environmental changes have also altered the 
distribution of mosquitos and other disease vectors. 
Beyond these naturally occurring outbreaks, the 
global health community is also working to address 
the concern of increasing antimicrobial resistance 
in pathogens that infect both humans and animals. 
There are also the ongoing global threats of the 
deliberate release of dangerous pathogens or the 
accidental release of a pathogen from a laboratory or 
other facility (e.g., the accidental release of poliovirus 
into the environment in 2014). The risk of biological 
weapon development and use will increase as related 
know-how and technologies become more broadly 
disseminated, less expensive, and easier to deploy.
The economic toll of pandemics is high. The 2002–2003 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome cost 
the global economy an estimated $40 billion.2  The 
next severe pandemic could cost the world economy 
up to $6 trillion.3  The World Bank estimates the overall 
economic impact of the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak 
on Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone alone was $2.8 
billion.4  Additionally, global health security, which 
relies on the capacity of all countries to detect and 
control health threats, is critical to the U.S. economy 
and jobs.5,6  Strategic investments in public and animal 
health capacity, including public and animal health 
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The vision of the GHSA is to achieve a world safe and 
secure from infectious disease threats, whether naturally 
occurring, accidental, or deliberately released.
systems and preparedness, need to be a national 
security priority of governments and a key commitment 
from multilateral agencies, development banks, NGOs, 
academia, and private sector stakeholders worldwide. 
The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is a  
multi-sectoral and multilateral effort that was launched 
in 2014 to accelerate progress toward compliance 
with the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
(2005), the World Organization for Animal Health’s 
Performance of Veterinary Services, the Biological 
Weapons Convention, and other relevant international 
frameworks and agreements. The IHR (2005) is a legally 
binding instrument adopted by 196 WHO Member 
States that sets requirements for each to prepare for 
health emergencies of all types. The vision of the GHSA 
is to achieve a world safe and secure from infectious 
disease threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, 
or deliberately released. GHSA seeks to leverage 
host government and donor partner investments to 
reduce morbidity, mortality, and economic loss by 
preventing avoidable infectious disease outbreaks, 
detecting threats early, and responding rapidly and 
effectively to outbreaks when they occur. GHSA 
advances IHR (2005) compliance by providing specific, 
measurable targets across the 11 technical areas,  
referred to as “Action Packages,” and supporting 
step-by-step plans to promote their achievement. 
It is more likely countries will miss the beginning of an 
outbreak and delay an effective response in the absence 
of health security capabilities, including: reliable, 
sensitive real-time disease surveillance systems; safe, 
secure, and strong laboratories; a well-trained workforce; 
capable information systems; a command structure 
to coordinate an effective and focused response; and 
multi-sectoral collaboration. Investments in these 
capabilities allow for rapid identification and response 
to stop outbreaks of new and emerging infectious 
diseases quickly before they spread around the globe.
The GHSA operates through an integrated partnership 
that includes member nations, WHO, the World 
Organization for Animal Health, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the U.N. (FAO), the World 
Bank, INTERPOL, other international organizations, 
development partners, non-governmental stakeholders, 
and the private sector. In order to achieve global health 
security, all partner countries must prioritize their own 
domestic funding to support public and animal health 
system improvement with the goal of sustainability.
As of January 2018, more than 60 countries have 
joined the GHSA. Each member country has made 
a commitment to achieve GHSA targets at national, 
regional, and/or global levels. The United States is a 
member of the GHSA and the 10-country GHSA Steering 
Group, serving as its first Chair. The United States leads 
or contributes to several GHSA Action Package working 
groups by sharing our domestic health experiences 
and lessons learned with partners around the world.
President Donald Trump has emphasized the importance of the GHSA, including at the U.N. 
General Assembly in September 2017, by highlighting that the GHSA is one of several programs 
that promote better health and opportunities all over the world. In July 2017, Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson stated, “The United States’ commitment to working in multi-sectoral partnerships 
to counter infectious diseases through the Global Health Security Agenda will remain constant.” 
In October 2017, at the GHSA Ministerial Meeting, the National Security Council Senior Director 
for Global Health Security and Biodefense, Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer (U.S. Navy, retired), 
emphasized U.S. support for GHSA going forward, by stating, “The United States believes that 
extending GHSA beyond 2018 will allow us to continue our collective progress toward the 
original vision of GHSA. We see opportunities to work together, to build on the successes, and 
focusing in addressing those most pressing needs in the next five years.”
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U.S. Approach
The United States is committed to working with 31 
countries and the Caribbean Community toward 
achieving GHSA targets across the 11 Action Packages, 
divided into a Phase I of 17 countries and Phase II of 
14 additional nations. In July 2015, the United States 
committed to investing $1 billion in new resources 
across the 17 Phase I countries to build capacity to 
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease 
outbreaks. As of Dec. 31, 2017, the U.S. Centers for 
Disease and Control and Prevention (CDC) has obligated 
$453.8 million, and USAID has obligated $245.5 million 
in support of this U.S. commitment to GHSA.8  This 
funding and technical assistance have helped these 
countries design and implement five-year GHSA plans 
that address specific gaps in health security capability 
across the GHSA Action Packages. The United States 
also works with the 14 additional Phase II GHSA 
partner countries and the Caribbean Community to 
develop GHSA plans and mobilize international partner 
resources to advance achievement of GHSA targets.
In December 2016, the United States published its 
first annual report on progress and early impact 
from the U.S. investment in the GHSA.9  Since the 
publication of that report, GHSA countries, with the 
help of U.S. and other partner investments, have 
continued to build capacities across each of the GHSA 
Action Packages. The information contained in this 
second annual report, which focuses on activities 
during the third year of the five-year U.S. Government 
GHSA commitment, highlights how these improved 
capacities have contributed to demonstrated impact 
in rapidly detecting and stopping outbreaks at their 
source. Within the U.S. Government, teams from the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense (DoD), 
the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department 
of Health and Human Services, including CDC, USAID, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National 
Security Council, and other departments and agencies 
are working within GHSA with the goal of keeping the 
world safe and secure from infectious disease threats.
The Role of Defense in Global Health Security 
Throughout much of the world, the local military 
has unique capabilities, including experience 
with logistics, command and control, and 
complex contingency operations, that can 
complement public and animal health capacities 
and efforts to prevent, detect, and report early 
outbreaks of disease. The GHSA provides a 
framework and umbrella under which defense 
departments can collaborate on threat reduction, 
bio-surveillance, and biosecurity objectives.
8. As of the end of fiscal year 2017, CDC had obligated $443.3 million in support of this U.S. commitment to GHSA. This figure reflects cumulative obligations from FY2015–FY2017, 
net of upward and downward adjustments made prior to Oct. 19, 2017.
9. https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ghsa-legacy-report.pdf?sfvrsn=12
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Our Partners
Internationally, multiple donor partners support 
GHSA objectives, and U.S. investments have helped to 
leverage additional support. The G-710  leaders made 
a collective commitment to assist 76 countries and 
regions. In 2017, Australia committed approximately 
$240 million over five years (2017–2022) to establish 
a new Health Security Initiative for the Indo-Pacific 
region to address rising health security threats. The 
Republic of Korea, through its Safe Life for All Initiative, 
has pledged $100 million in 13 countries over five 
years, focusing on immunization, national laboratory 
systems, and workforce development. Nordic countries 
made a collective commitment to assist 10 countries. 
Canada provided $20 million in 2016 to assist an 
additional 15 countries to fulfill commitments under the 
GHSA. Spain and Italy are strengthening laboratories 
and training personnel in Southeast Asia. The World 
Bank’s International Development Association 2018 
replenishment establishes a scaled-up commitment to 
strengthen country-level health security capacity in at 
least 25 countries. The World Bank is also implementing 
the $110 million Regional Disease Surveillance Systems 
Enhancement Project, which will assist countries 
to strengthen their disease detection systems and 
epidemic preparedness. In addition, Finland, Germany, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other countries, along 
with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, are helping 
support the WHO’s Joint External Evaluation (JEE) 
process to comply with the IHR (2005).
10. G7 members are the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom.
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Joint External Evaluations
In close coordination with the WHO, the United States, 
Finland, and other GHSA members and stakeholders 
assisted with the development and implementation 
of the JEE. The JEE is a voluntary, multi-sectoral 
external assessment process to identify gaps in 
capacity, determine a country’s current level of health 
security capacity, and measure progress in a country’s 
ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
diseases and other public health threats. Following a 
JEE, countries develop costed National Action Plans 
to address the gaps identified in the JEE and identify 
resources required; implement the national action 
plan; monitor progress in implementation of the 
plan; and repeat the external evaluation within four 
to five years. The JEE, which combines GHSA targets 
with additional core capacities required under the 
IHR (2005), allows countries to identify and address 
specific gaps within their health security systems 
and provides the basis for countries to engage 
with internal and external stakeholders to focus 
resources effectively, measurably, and sustainably. 
As of Jan. 26, 2018, 67 countries have completed a JEE 
(with 50 of those published online); 31 are expected 
to complete a JEE in 2018; and 12 have expressed 
an interest. Fifteen countries have made significant 
progress developing National Action Plans to address 
the gaps identified through their JEEs, and 10 others 
have plans under development. Many of the National 
Action Plans heavily leverage the U.S. Government GHSA 
plans developed earlier. In comparison, as of Nov. 30, 
2016, only 25 countries had completed evaluations, 
and none had begun developing National Action Plans. 
The United States continues to support these processes 
through participation in JEE missions; assisting 
countries to develop National Action Plans; and by 
providing strategic and technical guidance to WHO and 
other international organizations. 
The United States completed a JEE in May 2016, and 
the final report was published by WHO in June of 
the same year.11  Departments and agencies from all 
sectors of the U.S. Government have worked together 
to develop the National Action Plan to Strengthen 
Implementation of the IHR (2005) based on the 2016 
JEE. The plan includes action items to maintain or 
improve upon JEE indicator scores and address the 
recommendations from the external evaluators.
11. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/254701/1/WHO-WHE-CPI-2017.13-eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
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Strategic Vision for Global Health Security
GHSA builds capabilities across 11 specific technical areas, or Action  
Packages, that span multiple sectors and disciplines, including animal and 
human health, agriculture, and security. 
The following sections provide examples of U.S. support for GHSA implementation, including shared outcomes of 
our investments (what the U.S. technical and financial support coordinated with other partner investments have 
helped countries achieve) and evidence of impact (enhanced prevention, detection, and response to new infec-
tious disease threats that decreases the potential for widespread disease and mortality).
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The Shared Outcomes of  
U.S. Government Investments in the GHSA: 
Building Global Health Security Capacities
As described on page 5, the JEE is a WHO-led process for the transparent, external assessment of countries’ 
health security capacity. Each country that completes a JEE receives a score from 1 to 5 across indicators that 
span 19 technical areas that include the 11 GHSA Action Packages. The United States monitors GHSA country 
progress using the JEE scoring system. Twice per year, each U.S. embassy country health team estimates 
the impact of U.S. investments, coordinated with those of other partners, on the country’s abilities to 
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. For most indicators, gaining one level of capacity 
represents a significant accomplishment.
The tables on pages 8–10 capture the impact of U.S. support, coordinated with other partner investments, by 
describing the number of countries that have built the capacity needed to increase at least one point higher 
on the JEE scoring scale for technical areas related to the GHSA Action Packages. Representative examples of 
the progress achieved are in the fourth column.
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PREVENT
Countries have enhanced 
surveillance systems for
zoonotic diseases in humans, 
wildlife, and animals**
Countries have trained sta on 
biosafety and biosecurity to 
prevent avoidable infection**
Countries have enhanced 
surveillance systems for
zo notic diseases in humans, 
wildlife, and animals**
Countries have trained sta on 
biosafety and biosecurity to 
pr vent avoidable infection**
Countries have enhanced 
surveillance systems for
zoonotic diseases in humans, 
wildlife, and animals**
Countries have trained sta on 









Toward These Targets Action Package
Number of Phase I Countries with 
Capacity-level Increase over Baseline*
Examples of Implementation that 
Benefited from U.S. GHSA Assistance
Prevent the spread of drug-resistant 
pathogens with a strong plan and 
maintain capacity for detecting AMR 
and controlling infections
In Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, about 38,000 health care workers, 
community health agents, and other sta who come in contact with 
patients were trained in infection prevention and control  (IPC) 
standards and practices. In Sierra Leone alone, 303 health facilities 
received training and mentoring to improve IPC and 
prevent the spread of AMR.
In India, hospital sta strengthened their ability to detect and prevent 
the spread of antimicrobial-resistant infections, including through 
conducting outbreak investigations, laboratory-based detection of 
emerging pathogens, and improving isolation and 
transmission-based precautions.
Kenya established a multi-sectoral zoonotic surveillance system for 
rabies, Ri Valley fever, and anthrax. 
In Uganda, a district animal health lab confirmed an anthrax 
outbreak in goats and cattle, which helped to contain a 
resulting human outbreak. 
The Cote d’Ivoire animal health laboratory network 
shortened the time for detecting cases of avian influenza 
from three months to two to six days.
In Burkina Faso, lab sta in 10 priority labs that work with 
dangerous pathogens were trained in biosafety and biosecurity, 
and 25 veterinary lab technicians completed capacity building in 
biosafety and biosecurity.
Senior lab technicians in Liberia were trained in biosafety and 
biosecurity, produced standard operating procedures, and 
designed tools for internal biosafety and biosecurity audits. 
In India, 1,027 laboratory technicians from more than 159 
laboratory facilities across primarily four states (Gujarat, Tamil 
Nadu, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh) were trained in biorisk 
management and biosafety and biosecurity 
principles and applications.
Pakistan conducted house-to-house registration and outreach in 13 
districts of Sindh province, increasing measles vaccine coverage 
from 27 percent at baseline to 52 percent.
From June–August 2017, Ethiopia implemented a vaccination 
campaign in response to an emerging measles outbreak in the 
Somali region. 
Reduce the emergence and spread 
of infectious diseases from 
animals to humans
Prevent pathogens from being 
accidentally or deliberately released 
by building comprehensive 
biosafety and biosecurity systems
Prevent death and illness due to 
vaccine-preventable diseases 






Progress on the Ground
*U.S. Country Team assessments
**Data since GHSA launch
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Toward These Targets Action Package
Number of Phase I Countries with 
Capacity–level Increase over Baseline*
Examples of Implementation that 
Benefited from U.S. GHSA Assistance
Detect and diagnose infectious 
diseases by building strong 
laboratory networks
Bangladesh now has laboratory capability to detect high-consequence 
pathogens, including anthrax, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Nipah 
virus, and leptospirosis.
In Uganda, more than 20,000 pediatric admissions at six 
electronically-linked, sentinel hospitals were evaluated using enhanced 
laboratory capacity, including blood culture and antimicrobial 
sensitivity testing, resulting in the timely identification and treatment 
of bloodstream infections.
Sixty-eight veterinary labs in 21 GHSA Phase I and II countries 
completed comprehensive assessments that included infrastructure, 
range of diagnostics, quality assurance, and networking.
In Sierra Leone, timeliness and completeness of surveillance data 
reports reached almost 100 percent of health facilities in 2017, and data 
quality assessments documented a 14 percent increase in districts 
submitting high-quality data. In addition, Sierra Leone piloted a tool to 
conduct a comprehensive baseline evaluation of its national animal 
health surveillance system.
Vietnam piloted event-based surveillance with community engagement 
in detecting and reporting unusual health events and more than 100 
local outbreaks were reported in the first six months as a result. This 
initial success lead to a plan for national scale-up in 2018.
Guinea built capacity to identify emerging health threats with a new 
electronic information system, Épi-Détecte. Priority diseases were 
added to the system for rapid notification of epidemic-prone          
disease alerts.
In Senegal, the DHIS-2 electronic health surveillance platform is 
available to all 76 Health Districts, allowing regular reporting of routine 
and priority diseases to the national level.
In Vietnam, an electronic surveillance platform is now functional for 44 
communicable diseases and syndromes in all 63 provinces and 711 
districts, allowing real-time reporting and information sharing between 
the clinical and preventive medicine sectors.
For January–September 2017, across GHSA countries, there were more 
than 640 graduates from Field Epidemiology Training Program 
(FETP)-Frontline and more than 80 graduates from FETP-Advanced. 
During this same time, FETP-Advanced graduates investigated more 
than 290 outbreaks. 
Since 2015, across 79 universities in Africa and Asia, more than 11,500 
professionals were trained in “One Health” competencies, including 
zoonotic diseases and communications since 2015.
Detect and assess outbreaks in real 
time using high-quality data from 
robust surveillance networks
Minimize the impact of health 
events through increased access 
to timely and accurate 
information about outbreaks
Prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease outbreaks using 







Countries have detected dangerous 
pathogens using new equipment and 
capabilities**
Countries have established or expanded the 
training of field-based epidemiologists and 
surveillance oicers**
Countries improved reporting timeliness 
and/or geographic coverage to capture 
public health threats**
DETECT
Progress on the Ground
*U.S. Country Team assessments
**Data since GHSA launch
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RESPOND
Toward These Targets Action Package Number of Phase I Countries with Capacity-level Increase over Baseline*
Examples of Implementation that 
Benefited from U.S. GHSA Assistance
Reduce the impact of public 
health threats by developing an 
interconnected global 
network of EOCs
Cameroon has demonstrated strong emergency management 
capability, including through a government-led, full-scale 
cholera response exercise, and through rapid activation of its 
EOC for emergency response, including activation within 24 
hours to respond to a meningitis outbreak.
Bangladesh made significant improvements to its emergency 
management operations, including the first time activation of 
its EOC in response to a large Chikungunya outbreak in Dhaka 
in summer 2017.
In Liberia, public health and security authorities worked 
together to address several public health emergencies, 
including a meningitis outbreak and inspections of drinking 
water quality.
In Tanzania, government oicials from the transportation and 
health sectors developed an IHR (2005)-compliant public 
health emergency response plan for points of entry (airports). 
Standard operating procedures for sending and receiving 
non-medical emergency outbreak supplies were developed and 
will be pre-tested in Cameroon. 
U.S.-supported stockpiles provided 2,000 personal protective 
equipment (PPE) kits to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(to support an Ebola outbreak response), 300 PPE kits to Uganda 
(to respond to avian influenza), and 100 PPE kits to Guinea 
(to respond to anthrax). 
Integrate law enforcement into 
emergency planning and 
response to maintain civic order 
and security across borders 
in case of outbreaks
Lessen the impact of disease 
outbreaks through systems that 
deliver the right medicines and 









Progress on the Ground
RESPOND
16
Countries have established or 
strengthened their national EOCs 
to manage and monitor health 
events in real time**
13
Countries strengthened response 
coordination and shared information 
across public health, animal health, 
and law enforcement**
10
Countries improved logistics planning to 
deploy sta, medicines, and supplies 
during a public health emergency**
*U.S. Country Team assessments
**Data since GHSA launch
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Evidence of GHSA Impact in 2017
U.S. support to GHSA countries has helped to prevent 
or curtail the spread of infectious disease outbreaks. 
In 2017, there were more than 25 reported public 
health emergencies in U.S.-assisted GHSA countries, 
defined by the WHO Emergency Response Framework 
(2017) as a public health event that exceeds the 
ability of the country to respond. The causes of these 
emergencies included outbreaks of Marburg virus, 
Ebola virus, dengue fever, and acute watery diarrhea/
cholera. The majority of these events occurred in 
Africa and caused significant morbidity, mortality, 
and economic loss. Many countries faced multiple 
outbreaks throughout the year. For example, in 2017, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dealt with 
a range of outbreaks and events, including Ebola, 
cholera, avian influenza, and vaccine-derived polio. 
With few exceptions, partner countries led the 
responses to these outbreaks by using the 
improved capacities built with the help of GHSA, 
the United States, and other partners.
Early Detection of Serious Infectious Diseases 
and Effective Responses to Outbreaks 
GRADED EMERGENCIES IN 
U.S. ASSISTED GHSA COUNTRIES 
Acute Watery Diarrhea in Ethiopia (August 2017) 
– Grade 3 Protracted Emergency: The Ethiopian 
Public Health Institute activated the country’s public 
health emergency operations center (PHEOC) for the 
first time to respond to an outbreak of acute watery 
diarrhea in multiple regions of Ethiopia. U.S.-supported 
workforce training programs helped prepare the country 
to manage the outbreak, as Ethiopia appointed a 
Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) graduate 
to lead the response. The United States assisted the 
Ethiopian Public Health Institute to establish an incident 
management system, deploy rapid response teams, 
and develop processes for task tracking and situational 
reporting. In addition, the United States supported 
hygiene-promotion activities, the provision of water 
treatment supplies, and other water and sanitation 
activities to prevent future acute watery diarrhea 
transmission in much of the affected areas. 
Dengue Fever in Burkina Faso (September 2017, 
ongoing) – Grade 1 Emergency:  Burkina Faso, in 
collaboration with the United States, the WHO, the FAO, 
and other partners, helped to stem a large outbreak 
of dengue fever, a priority zoonotic disease for the 
country. Over a two-month period, Burkina Faso 
reported more than 14,000 probable human dengue 
cases and 29 deaths. With U.S. support, Burkina Faso 
enhanced in-country capacity to diagnose dengue at 
the national reference lab, including the identification 
of serotypes, and established surveillance for dengue 
and other arboviral diseases in Ouagadougou, which 
builds upon an existing surveillance system.  
Marburg Virus in Uganda (October 2017) – Grade 
2 Emergency: The U.S.-assisted viral hemorrhagic 
fever laboratory at the Uganda Virus Research Institute 
confirmed a positive case of Marburg from a sample 
obtained from eastern Uganda. There were three 
reported cases (two confirmed and one probable), 
all of which were fatal. The Ministry of Health quickly 
deployed a rapid response team, which included staff 
trained through the U.S.-supported FETP and the 
Uganda Virus Research Institute viral hemorrhagic 
fever program, and students from the U.S.-supported 
Makerere University One Health Innovation Club, to 
the affected districts. The team rapidly traced the 
contacts of suspected cases and conducted community 
education activities. No further cases were identified, 
and there was no spread into Kenya even though one 
suspected case had traveled across the border. 
EXAMPLES OF OTHER EMERGENCIES IN 
U.S. ASSISTED GHSA COUNTRIES
Avian Influenza A(H5N8) in Birds in Uganda 
(January 2017): A possible influenza pandemic caused 
by a mutating virus that jumps from animals to humans 
remains a critical threat to global health security. The 
Uganda Wildlife Education Center reported a massive 
die-off of approximately 10,000 migratory birds and 
Within the WHO Emergency Response Framework, Grade 3 emergencies require a major 
international response; Grade 2 emergencies require a moderate international response; and 
Grade 1 emergencies require a limited international response. A protracted emergency is one 
that persists longer than six months. Ungraded emergencies are serious events that often 
involve large numbers of people and substantial multi-sectoral assistance but do not require an 
operational response by WHO.
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domestic birds on the shores of Lake Victoria to the 
Ugandan PHEOC, which activated rapidly, along with the 
multi-sectoral National Taskforce for Epidemics.  
Building upon the successes of long-term U.S. 
Government support for influenza surveillance and 
response in Uganda, national and district multi-sectoral 
rapid response teams, including FETP Advanced Fellows 
and veterinary and public health students from the 
Makerere University One Health program, conducted 
outbreak investigations. U.S. funding and technical 
assistance to the Uganda Virus Research Institute 
facilitated the initial diagnostic confirmation of the 
first highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in East 
Africa. Enhanced surveillance in avian populations is 
ongoing with no suspected human cases to date.
Avian Influenza in Bangladesh (January 2017): 
Benefitting from U.S.-funded training activities on health 
security, the staff of the Bangladesh Department of 
Livestock Services detected multiple outbreaks of avian 
influenza for the first time in backyard poultry, which 
marked the first reported and investigated outbreaks 
of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Bangladesh in 
two years. U.S. technical assistance helped Bangladeshi 
professionals to investigate the crow die-offs (which 
were linked to the poultry outbreaks); the sampling of 
the crows and other wild birds near live bird markets 
to permit laboratory testing; and train field staff from 
the Forest Department (Wildlife Authority). In addition, 
the United States provided technical support to the 
Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute, which tested 
and confirmed H5-type influenza virus in the crows by 
using specific laboratory assays.
Preventing a Measles Outbreak in Cote d’Ivoire 
(February 2017): After a measles outbreak in 
neighboring Guinea, staff from the Cote d’Ivoire Ministry 
of Health coordinated with counterparts from Guinea 
and Liberia with the goal of preventing the outbreak 
from crossing borders. Subsequently, with the help of 
the United States, the Ivorian Government conducted 
measles sensitization and vaccination campaigns at six 
points of entry. Community sensitization committees 
continued to conduct risk communication campaigns 
and work with health centers to identify and vaccinate 
unvaccinated children. As a result, Cote d’Ivoire 




Meningococcal Disease in Liberia (April 2017): 
Liberia reported 14 cases, and eight deaths, from an 
unidentified illness. The country quickly mobilized 14 
U.S.-trained Liberian disease detectives, activated the 
new national PHEOC, and deployed a national rapid 
response team. Local laboratory testing ruled out Ebola 
within 24 hours, and CDC laboratories in the United 
States confirmed the cause as meningococcal disease, a 
deadly bacterial illness; CDC laboratories also provided 
reagents to Liberia for further testing. Rapid and 
coordinated response interventions, such as contact-
tracing, limited the outbreak to 31 cases and 13 deaths.
Ebola in DRC (May 2017): A cluster of undiagnosed 
illnesses and deaths with hemorrhagic symptoms was 
identified in the remote Likati Health Zone in northern 
DRC. Two days later, DRC laboratory workers confirmed 
the outbreak as Ebola. Laboratory confirmation of this 
pathogen by a DRC scientist in the country’s national 
laboratory is a positive public health milestone for 
the country. A group of disease detectives, trained 
in DRC through U.S.-funded programs, immediately 
deployed to trace potentially exposed contacts and to 
provide technical support. The United States supported 
the outbreak response through the deployment of 
field epidemiologists, a mobile laboratory, and the 
provision of laboratory reagents and PPE. Fast and 
coordinated action contained the Ebola outbreak 
in an isolated area of DRC to only eight cases, four 
deaths, and no spread outside of the area.
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever in Uganda 
(August 2017): The Uganda districts of Kyankwanzi 
and Nakaseke experienced an outbreak of Crimean 
Congo hemorrhagic fever. The outbreak posed serious 
health and economic implications because this zoonotic 
disease is a major threat to livestock, and these districts 
are major cattle-rearing areas. Early detection and the 
launch of control activities by rapid-response teams in 
less than 48 hours limited the outbreak to two confirmed 
cases. The Ministry of Health worked with the WHO 
and the United States to establish a district-level task 
force, set up isolation wards, conduct environmental 
testing, educate the community, and train health 
workers on the treatment and prevention of Crimean 
Congo hemorrhagic fever. With U.S. support, other GHSA 
countries have also strengthened diagnostic capacity 
for Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, including India, 
which diagnosed cases in two states, and identified 
evidence of livestock infections in multiple states.
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Examples of Innovative Programming
The Frontline FETP Trains Disease Detectives: 
For more than three decades, CDC has worked with 
ministries of health and other partners around the 
world to build local capacities and strengthen the 
national public health workforce through programs 
like the FETP. To expand workforce capabilities at the 
local level, CDC launched FETP-Frontline in 2015, a 
three-month training program focused on detecting 
and responding to diseases and events of public health 
importance or international concern. FETP-Frontline 
participants include government public health workers 
in charge of the collection, compilation, analysis, 
and reporting of surveillance data, and response 
activities at the local level of a health system. Within 
24 months, FETP-Frontline launched programs in 
30 countries, including 15 U.S.-funded GHSA Phase 
I countries (including countries that launched a 
version of FETP-Frontline prior to 2015). More than 
3,500 trainees had graduated from FETP-Frontline 
Programs by December 2017. FETP-Frontline trainees 
and graduates have actively participated in responses 
to outbreaks of cholera, measles, yellow fever, and 
other diseases, by identifying suspected outbreaks 
early and raising standards for quality investigations.
One Health Workforces Link Animal and Human 
Health Sectors: In 79 universities in Africa and Asia, 
USAID-financed One Health University Networks have 
developed more than 22 training modules in One Health 
competencies, including zoonotic diseases; infectious 
disease management; biorisk and biosecurity; behavior 
change communication; and linkages between animal 
and human health. These universities created 34 One 
Health student innovation clubs, and established 23 
demonstration sites to promote field-based learning in 
nine countries. Students and faculty participated in 10 
outbreak responses and investigations in Ethiopia and 
Uganda. In addition, more than 50 people were placed 
in local and international health organizations to gain 
practical experience in applying a One Health approach. 
USDA Training Programs Leverage Academia to 
Enhance Animal Health Workforce: USDA worked with 
Iowa State and Michigan State Universities to support 
the participation of 16 educators from Africa in the USDA 
Faculty-Exchange Program for African Veterinary Science 
to help improve veterinary curricula and instruction 
at the participants’ universities. USDA collaborated 
with academic partners at the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture, Iowa State University, and other partners 
to deliver training on animal health and food safety 
risk assessment for the Chief Veterinary Officer of St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Through the USDA Norman 
E. Borlaug International Agricultural Science Fellowship 
Program, a scientist from the Uganda Ministry of 
Health received training at Kansas State University on 
epidemiological investigation of Rift Valley fever to help 
improve Uganda’s capacity to detect and control Rift 
Valley fever outbreaks in animals rapidly and reduce risks 
of Rift Valley fever transmission to people
PREDICT Detects Emerging Threats: Through 
the PREDICT project, USAID supports the most 
comprehensive effort to date to strengthen capacities 
for the improved detection, identification, and 
characterization of priority zoonotic diseases and 
spillover risk for emerging threats in the world’s  
most-vulnerable hotspots for emerging diseases. In 
12 African countries, the PREDICT project, working 
primarily through local laboratories, has tested 
samples from 4,623 animals and 451 humans for 
high-priority viral families, such as corona-, filo-, flavi-, 
influenza-, and paramyxoviruses, associated with 
high-consequence outbreaks such as Ebola, Marburg, 
influenza, and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
coronavirus. The PREDICT project identified nine new 
viruses now being studied further to determine the risk 
posed to humans. In addition, PREDICT conducted 
in-depth behavioral interviews with more than 1,400 
individuals to help identify the enabling behaviors 
and practices associated with transmission of priority 
zoonotic diseases and other emerging threats.
The Public Health Emergency Management  
Fellowship Trains Emergency Managers: CDC 
established the Public Health Emergency Management 
(PHEM) Fellowship in response to increased demand for 
assistance from countries that are seeking to strengthen 
their PHEM capacity. During the four-month program, 
PHEM Fellows receive advanced training in all major 
functional areas of emergency management. PHEM 
Fellowship participation has directly affected countries’ 
ability to reduce the time between the notification of 
an emergency and activation of the national PHEOC. 
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After completion of the program, PHEM Fellow alumni 
have been promoted into roles such as PHEOC Manager 
in Cote d’Ivoire, PHEOC Operations Chief in Senegal, 
Incident Manager for an avian influenza outbreak in 
Cameroon, Ebola-Response Manager in DRC, and 
other PHEM functional area positions. As of December 
2017, 69 fellows have graduated from 28 countries. 
One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization 
Identifies Zoonotic Threats: CDC’s One Health 
Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Tool brings together 
multi-sectoral stakeholders from human health, animal 
health, environmental health, and other relevant 
sectors to address zoonotic disease prevention and 
control in a country. In fiscal year 2017, 10 workshops 
were conducted in GHSA countries; nine were led by 
CDC and supported by USAID, through operational 
assistance and the convening of national One Health 
platforms and multi-sectoral partners. CDC, USDA, 
and DoD collaborated on a similar workshop in 
Pakistan. Having a jointly developed list of priority 
zoonotic diseases enables a country to focus limited 
financial and human resources to build laboratory 
capacity, strengthen surveillance in humans and 
animals, develop joint outbreak response teams 
and preparedness plans, and to create collaborative 
prevention and control strategies. Commonly prioritized 
zoonotic diseases included rabies; zoonotic influenza 
viruses; viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola virus 
and Rift Valley fever; brucellosis; and anthrax. 
One Health Coordination Supports Whole-Of-
Government Action: USAID has assisted 12 GHSA 
countries to develop or strengthen national One Health 
working groups by using a multi-sectoral approach 
for coordination. National groups were launched this 
year in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. One 
Health groups coordinate across ministries to improve 
preparedness and incident management and have 
helped respond to infectious disease threats, including 
recent avian influenza outbreaks in Bangladesh and 
Uganda, anthrax in Tanzania, meningococcal disease 
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in Liberia, and Marburg in Uganda. One Health groups 
in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cameroon, Kenya, and 
Uganda have incorporated public health threats beyond 
emerging infectious diseases, such as antimicrobial 
resistance, into their preparedness planning. 
Event-based Surveillance Systems Detect Unusual 
Events: CDC has spearheaded efforts to enhance Event-
based Surveillance Systems (EBS) in U.S.-supported 
GHSA countries. For example, the EBS pilot platform 
in Vietnam trained nearly 9,000 public health workers 
and reported 4,323 potential events, 317 of which 
required a public health response. In 2018, the Vietnam 
Ministry of Health is preparing to integrate EBS into its 
national surveillance system and launch it across the 
entire country. In Burkina Faso, a community-based 
EBS system to detect and report unusual health events 
of potential public health importance is being piloted 
in three districts. Launched in August 2017, the pilot 
has trained approximately 1,200 community health 
workers and approximately 200 nurses and staff at local 
health posts in EBS protocols. These health workers 
have notified, investigated, and controlled eight 
confirmed public health threats since August 2017.
The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program 
Partners with Tanzania to Stop the Spread of 
Anthrax: In November 2016, a massive die-off of 
animals was reported in northern Tanzania, resulting 
in more than 130 deaths in wild and domestic 
animals and reports of human cases of skin lesions 
consistent with anthrax infection. Investigation teams 
collected samples and performed diagnostic testing. 
The teams attributed the sudden increase in animal 
deaths to Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) infections. To 
prevent this outbreak from spreading further, a DoD 
Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) 
project designed to investigate dangerous pathogens 
in bushmeat helped to coordinate anthrax outbreak 
detection and response activities on behalf of the 
Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute. CBEP provided 
personal protective and diagnostic equipment and 
assisted with community education programs, which 
cautioned against consumption of bushmeat and the 
harvesting of animal products. The team also worked 
with local and central government administrators on 
how the laboratory at the Nelson Mandela African 
Institute for Science and Technology could effectively 
participate as a reference laboratory, providing safe 
and secure diagnostic work during this and future 
outbreaks. As a result of the collaboration, this imminent 
disease threat was prevented from spreading further; 
capabilities were established to detect future cases of 
anthrax accurately, quickly, and safely, whether naturally 
occurring or intentionally spread; and best practices were 
instilled for safe and secure handling of B. anthracis.
Advanced Molecular Detection for Faster Detection 
of Threats to Public Health: Detecting and responding 
to public health threats relies on a robust laboratory 
system capable of identifying known, unknown, or 
newly evolving pathogens. CDC supports laboratory 
capacity-building under GHSA through the provision 
of quality-assured reagents; external quality assurance 
panels; hands-on laboratory trainings; and remote 
assistance for the testing of viral pathogens that cause 
measles, gastrointestinal diseases, respiratory diseases, 
and other priority pathogens. In addition, CDC continues 
to improve Advanced Molecular Detection (AMD) 
capabilities in select GHSA countries. AMD technology 
enables faster detection of novel or emerging organisms. 
Joint West Africa Research Group Improves 
Biopreparedness: Joint West Africa Research Group 
(JWARG) is a DoD-funded, collaborative initiative that 
leverages existing research platforms and relationships 
to improve biopreparedness by strengthening research 
capabilities in the region. In 2017, JWARG’s first clinical 
study on sepsis enrolled nearly 200 severely ill patients 
in Ghana and will help increase global understanding of 
diseases causing severe illness, lead to identification of 
biomarkers to diagnose sepsis, predict course of illness, 
diagnose pathogens, and inform clinicians to provide 
more-personalized treatment of sepsis patients. In 
September 2017, JWARG began another study designed 
to identify and characterize cases of suspected severe 
infectious disease at medical centers in West Africa, 
which will help identify new threats early and assist in 
developing and implementing well-informed responses.
DoD Develops a Rapid Response Capability for  
Medical Countermeasure Development and  
Deployment: The Joint Mobile Emerging Disease 
Intervention Clinical Capability (JMEDICC) team brings 
technical experts from the DoD together with Ugandan 
stakeholders at all levels to conduct clinical research 
that supports development of medical countermeasures 
(MCM) and provides critical capacity to outbreak 
response efforts. In October 2017, Uganda declared 
an outbreak of Marburg. By request of the Ministry of 
Health, the JMEDICC team members provided technical 
assistance to the Uganda National Task Force and  
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Rapid-Response Teams, both in the PHEOC and in 
affected areas.  
 
FAO Helps Respond to Outbreaks of Avian Influenza 
across GHSA Countries: Since the launch of GHSA in 
2014, 16 U.S. partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia have experienced more than 50 outbreaks 
of highly pathogenic avian influenza. USAID funding 
to FAO and other partners builds national capacity 
to detect and respond to these outbreaks through: 
provision of lab reagents and biological markers for 
viral characterization; outbreak investigation and 
response; the provision of commodities, such as 
personal protective equipment (PPE) for field and 
laboratory technicians; upgraded biosecurity in farms 
and markets; and improved coordination across 
sectors. Since 2015, FAO has provided more than 
13,000 pieces of PPE to countries directly affected by 
highly pathogenic avian influenza and to neighboring 
countries. With USAID support through FAO, countries 
are reducing their response time. For example, since 
2015, FAO has helped the government of Vietnam 
to reduce  the duration between outbreak start and 
laboratory confirmation from 4.5  to about 3 days.
Waste Management Helps Stop the Spread of 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Waste management 
was a major problem during the Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa. In response, CDC is working with its 
partners to design an innovative medical waste 
disposal unit that will effectively treat medical 
waste produced at community health centers in 
low-resource settings. The units are built with 
locally available materials, equipment, and labor at 
low cost, and detailed illustrated instructions will 
be freely available. A unit is currently undergoing 
pilot testing in Kenema, Sierra Leone.  
Strengthening Global Capacities for the 
International Deployment of MCM and Personnel: 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Health and 
Human Services for Preparedness and Response led  
the Global Health Security Initiative MCM Task Force, in 
collaboration with the WHO, in finalizing the Operational 
Framework for Deployment of the WHO Smallpox 
Vaccine Emergency Stockpile. The WHO officially 
published the framework in December 2017.12  This 
document describes procedures for requesting and 
deploying smallpox vaccines and ancillary supplies from 
the Smallpox Vaccine Emergency Stockpile in the event 
of a smallpox outbreak. It also serves as the basis for 
the development of general planning considerations 
for the international deployment of MCMs during public 
health emergencies, a tool to aid key stakeholders 
that could provide, or receive, emergency MCMs 
during public health and medical emergencies in 
building legal, regulatory, and logistical capacities 
and establishing plans for their deployment/receipt.
State Biosecurity Engagement Program Trains 
Guinean Law Enforcement to Respond to Public 
Health Emergencies: Security and health are 
increasingly linked in our rapidly evolving world, and 
it is critical that we learn to collaborate rapidly and 
effectively. In order to further this objective, in March 
2017, the State Department's Biosecurity Engagement 
program supported a multisectoral training workshop 
in Guinea focused on biosecurity and law enforcement 
response to public health emergencies. This event 
aimed to strengthen coordination and intervention 
capabilities between the Guinean police, civil protection, 
gendarme, and Guinean Ministry of Health at the 
national level to prevent and detect deliberate or 
naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks. This 
training also helped ensure that in addition to medical 
first responders, unsuspecting first responders from 
non-health sectors with minimal exposure to public 
health response processes were trained on protecting 
themselves during these outbreaks. As such, participants 
were trained on PPE, personal decontamination, 
international biosecurity best-practices to prevent 
bioterrorism, and cross-agency communication 
efforts to respond to public health emergencies.
12. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/icg/smallpox-vaccine-emergency-stockpile/en/
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Amplifying Impact through         
Public Diplomacy and Engagement
Collaboration across the U.S. Government and with 
governmental, non-governmental, and private sector 
partners from around the world is critical to the 
success of the GHSA. This year, leaders from across the 
U.S. Government engaged in effective public diplomacy 
and active outreach in bilateral and multilateral 
meetings, as well as other international events to 
advance U.S. and broader GHSA objectives to build 
global health security capacity. The examples below 
highlight some of the effects of public diplomacy 
and how government and non-governmental 
engagement advanced global health security in 2017.
Non-governmental and Private-sector Partners 
Develop New Tools to Improve Global Health 
Security: Non-governmental stakeholders, through 
the GHSA Consortium (GHSAC), GHSA Private-Sector 
Roundtable (PSRT), and the Next Generation for 
Global Health Security Network (NextGen), are critical 
partners in building, maintaining, and sustaining 
international capacity. The private sector, NGOs, 
academic institutions, professional societies, and other 
institutions not only create and implement innovative 
solutions to combat infectious disease threats, but 
also provide the expertise needed for governments to 
fill critical gaps toward advancing compliance with the 
IHR (2005). In 2017, the GHSAC, PSRT, and NextGen all 
achieved successes in advancing global health security 
capacity. With a focus on the financing of health security 
capacity, a member of the GHSAC Steering Committee 
developed open-access online costing and tracking 
tools designed to help nations assess the financial 
costs of implementing health security activities from 
the JEEs and promote accountability in tracking global 
funding commitments. Through the PSRT, companies 
developed an online platform to display and analyze 
qualitative and quantitative data from countries’ JEE 
reports, which GHSA stakeholders, including countries 
and donors, can use to visualize gaps in health security 
in need of prioritization and investment. This interactive 
tool also displays private sector products and services 
that could assist countries with solutions for the gaps 
identified in the JEEs. Also in 2017, the NextGen network 
provided technical expertise in WHO-led JEE missions 
and created two regional working groups of health 
professionals in East and West Africa, which created 
opportunities to exchange knowledge across borders 
and to provide in-country support to local governments.
Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Package Takes the 
Spotlight: In 2017, the Bureau of International Security 
and Nonproliferation at the Department of State led the 
U.S. Secretariat for the Working Group on the biosafety 
and biosecurity Action Package. The group promotes 
activities, resources, and tools to advance targets related 
to biosafety and biosecurity, in addition to encouraging 
reduced collections of dangerous pathogens worldwide. 
Under U.S. leadership, the Secretariat supported 
the development of a JEE Qualitative Assessment, a 
fact sheet, and a strategic messaging document for 
the Action Package. The Secretariat also organized 
an Action Package meeting where countries shared 
recent successes, and the group began thinking 
creatively about how to ensure that biosafety and 
biosecurity remain a focus of the GHSA through 2024.
 18    |  Implementing the Global Health Security Agenda
Looking Forward
While we have made significant progress toward achieving the targets of the GHSA, there is still much work to do.  
As reflected in JEE reports, all countries still have progress to make across multiple technical areas. For example,  
surveillance and national laboratory systems, though improved, are still limited in scope in many countries. Animal 
health capacities are routinely weaker than corresponding ones for human health, and work on AMR on both the 
human and animal side is just gaining momentum. The United States looks forward to continuing to fulfill its com-
mitment to the GHSA by building our own capacities and addressing the areas for improvement identified by our JEE, 
and helping our partners build the capacities necessary to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats.
At the October 2017 GHSA Ministerial 
Meeting in Uganda, 400 participants 
from more than 40 GHSA member 
countries declared their support in 
the “Kampala Declaration” to extend 
GHSA for an additional five years 
(through 2024). The extension of GHSA 
ensures the continuation of work to 
build capacity and strengthen health 
systems to protect the national security 
of all nations against infectious disease 
threats. The U.S. Government, as part 
of its role on the GHSA Steering Group, 
is leading a working group to formulate 
the GHSA multilateral initiative for the 
next phase to include a renewed focus 
on building country capacity, obtaining 
sustainable national financing of health 
security capacity, strengthening multi-
sectoral collaboration and engagement, 
and increasing cooperation with 
the non-governmental sector. 
GHSA has succeeded in making 
health security a global priority and 
accelerated progress across the animal-
health, human-health, environmental, 
defense, and security sectors to advance 
implementation of the IHR (2005). The 
United States believes each country’s 
ability to prevent, detect, and respond 
to infectious disease threats directly 
protects that country’s own national 
security as well as that of the global 
community. An infectious disease outbreak anywhere can be a threat everywhere. In the 100 years since the 1918 
influenza pandemic, we have made much progress in our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to disease threats: 
stronger surveillance systems; new and improved laboratory diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics; and increased 
global reporting of outbreaks and other public health threats. However, there is still work to do to prevent future 
outbreaks. We will continue to strive to achieve global compliance with the IHR (2005), the World Organization 
for Animal Health’s Performance of Veterinary Services, the Biological Weapons Convention, and other relevant 
international frameworks and agreements through our GHSA commitments at home and abroad.





Key Roles as defined by the Executive Order – Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to 
Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats (November 4, 2016): 
In conjunction with the other relevant agencies, departments, and agencies will:
Executive Office staff
(National Security 
Council, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, 




Convene a GHSA Interagency Review Council (Council) to perform the responsibilities described in the 
Executive Order – Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure 
from Infectious Disease Threats.
Serve as chair of the Council as designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
in coordination with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.







Engage Chiefs of Mission, country teams, and regional and functional bureaus within the Department of 
State to promote the GHSA with international partners and to facilitate country-level implementation of 
U.S. programmatic activities.
Monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving GHSA targets, determine where more work is needed, 
and work with agencies and international partners to identify the partners best placed to achieve the 
GHSA targets for countries the United States has made a commitment to assist.
Facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of State programs to further the GHSA.
Coordinate planning, implementation, and evaluation of GHSA activities with the U.S. Global Malaria 
Coordinator at the USAID, and the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator at the Department of State in the coun-
tries the United States has made a commitment to assist.
Lead diplomatic outreach, including at senior levels, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, to 
build international support for the GHSA.
Work, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, with other donors and non-governmental imple-
menters in partner countries in order to leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
Coordinate, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the U.S. Government relationship with foreign 
and domestic GHSA non-governmental stakeholders, including the private sector, non-governmental 





Facilitate implementation and coordination of USAID programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide 
technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a com-
mitment to assist.
Provide, in conjunction with other agencies, strategic technical guidance for achieving GHSA targets.
Work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA teams, with other donors and 
non-governmental GHSA implementers in partner countries in which USAID programs are active in order 
to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
Department of Defense • 
• 
• 
Facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of Defense programs to further the GHSA, as 
well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has 
made a commitment to assist.
Work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and 
non-governmental implementers in partner countries in which Department of Defense programs are 
active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
Coordinate and communicate, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, with defense ministries with 
regard to the GHSA, including at the GHSA Ministerial and Steering Group.
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Department of Health 
and Human Services 
• Represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States at GHSA Ministerial and Steer-
ing Group meetings and in working with G7 and G20 Health Ministers on the GHSA, and coordinate U.S. 
Government support for those activities.
• Provide overall leadership and coordination for the GHSA Action Packages, which consist of country 
commitments to advance and share best practices toward specific GHSA targets, including serving as 
the primary point of contact for the Action Packages, providing support to Action Package leaders, and 
tracking overall progress on the Action Packages.
• Coordinate U.S. Government support for and participation in external evaluations, including the WHO 
JEE tool and the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation.
• Represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States in coordination and communi-
cation with the WHO regarding the GHSA.
• Facilitate, no less than every 4 years, the request for an external assessment, such as the process out-
lined within the WHO JEE tool, of U.S. Government domestic efforts to implement the IHR and the GHSA 
and work to publish the assessment to the general public.
• Consolidate and publish to the general public an external assessment of U.S. domestic capability to 
address infectious disease threats and implement the IHR, including the ability to achieve the targets 
outlined within the WHO JEE tool and including the gaps identified by such external assessment.
U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention
• Facilitate implementation and coordination of U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention pro-
grams to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in 
countries the United States has made a commitment to assist.
• Provide, in conjunction with other agencies, strategic technical guidance for achieving GHSA targets.
• Provide, in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, strategic technical support 
for and participate in external assessments, including the WHO JEE tool, and the Alliance for Country 
Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR implementation.Work, in conjunction with interagency 
partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and non-governmental implementers in 
partner countries in which the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention programs are active in 
order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
Department of Justice, 
Attorney General acting 
through the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation
• Serve, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, as the U.S. Government lead for GHSA targets relat-
ing to linking public health and law enforcement, and coordinate with INTERPOL on the GHSA and its 
successful implementation.
• Facilitate implementation and coordination of FBI programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide 
technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a com-
mitment to assist.
• Work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and 
non-governmental implementers in partner countries in which FBI programs are active in order to coor-
dinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
Department of 
Agriculture
• Represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States in coordination and communi-
cation with the FAO and OIE with regard to the GHSA.
• Facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of Agriculture programs to further the GHSA, 
as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States 
has made a commitment to assist.
• Work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors, 
contributing international organizations, and non-governmental implementers in partner countries in 
which Department of Agriculture programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments 
to advance the GHSA with partners.
Department of  
Homeland Security
• Assess the impacts of global health threats on homeland security operations.
• Lead, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Agriculture, U.S. Government GHSA activities related to global health threats at U.S. borders 
and ports of entry.


